Utah v. Michael Shawn Casey : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
Utah v. Michael Shawn Casey : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Linda M. Jones; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorney for Appellant.
Jeffery S. Gray, Assistant Attorney General; Mark Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Susan Hunt; Salt
Lake District Attorney's Office; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Casey, No. 20000122 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2632
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL SHAWN CASEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 20000122-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR ATTEMPTED MURDER, A 
SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
4-101 & § 76-5-203 (1999), AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A THIRD DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-103 (1999), 
CHILD ABUSE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-109.1 (1999), AND ENHANCEMENT PENALTIES FOR 
USE OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-3-203 (1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE ANNE M. STIRBA 
PRESIDING 
LINDA M. JONES 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n 
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
JEFFREY S. GRAY, Bar No. 5852 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
SUSAN HUNT 
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
FILED 
Attorneys for Appelloeah Court of Appeal 
O 0 9 2001 
PautetteStagg 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL SHAWN CASEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 20000122-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR ATTEMPTED MURDER, A 
SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
4-101 & § 76-5-203 (1999), AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A THIRD DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-103 (1999), 
CHILD ABUSE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-109.1 (1999), AND ENHANCEMENT PENALTIES FOR 
USE OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-3-203 (1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE ANNE M. STIRBA 
PRESIDING 
JEFFREY S. GRAY, Bar No. 5852 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
LINDA M. JONES SUSAN HUNT 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS -± 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Hz 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
Summary of Proceedings Below 3 
Summary of Facts 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . 10 
ARGUMENT H. 
I. DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTING 
TO INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSE THE DEATH OF 
TRESA FRANZ i i 
II. DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT AND ATTEMPTED MURDER 19 
CONCLUSION . . 24 
NO ADDENDA NECESSARY 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASE AUTHORITY 
Bartlett v. State, 711 N.E.2d 497 (Ind. 1999) J J 
Free v. State, 455 So.2d 137 (Ala. App. 1984) H 
Gentry v. State, 881 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. App. 1994) 17 
Huittv. State, 678 P.2d415 (Alaska App. 1984) 18 
People v. Files, 632 N.E.2d 1087 (111. App. 1994) 18 
People v. Gonzalez, 926 P.2d 153 (Colo. App. 1996) 17 
State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989) 15 
Statev. Betha,957P.2d611 (Utah App. 1998) 2 
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997) 4 
State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996) 23 
State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502 (Utah 1986) 16,18 
State v. Feliciano, 618 P.2d 306 (Haw. 1980) 12 
State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,994 P.2d 1243 22 
State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630 (Utah 1997) 16 
State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993) 15,16 
Statev. Howell,649 P.2d91 (Utah 1982) 15 
State v. ./o/mso/i, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991) 12 
State v. /o/mtf, 712 P.2d 843 (Utah 1986) 22 
State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980) 23 
-ii-
State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982) 10-12 
State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Utah App. 1989) 20 
State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237 (Utah 1978) 15 
State v. Nunez, 769 P.2d 1040 (Ari. App. 1989) U, \7 
State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (Utah 1986) 20 
State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1997) 23 
State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406 (Utah 1984) H 
State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986) 23 
State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996) 16 
State v. Turner, 587 A.2d 1050 (Conn. App.), cert, denied, 
591 A.2d 812 (Conn. 1991) 18 
State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992) 2,13-15 
State v. White, 880 P.2d 18 (Utah App. 1994) 12 
State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1989) 22 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999) 19, 20,23 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1999) i 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999) 1,2,12,14 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109.1 (1999) i 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1999) 1 
-iii-
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996) I 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) \2 
Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary (1988) \2 
-IV-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
M \ I I Oh I I A l l , 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL SHAWN CASEY, 
IMnnl:inl :iinl \p|M'll:uif. 
i ' . I S O N i l ' O d I M I I ! ! I V 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from Ins (nm letinnsforattemptedmui'dt'r.a •• . ', 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 70-4-101 (1999) and Utah Code Ann. 9 76-5-20* - '"'•>«' ••, 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5103(1999), 
."> 1 / 1 n 09), and 
enhancement penalties for each count for tH 1 
Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1999), Fhis Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(l996). 
STATEMENT OF HIE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented u, ihc ^uuu ior review, together will) I In1 
respective standards of appellate review: 
1 
FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL. IS attempted murder under the intentional or knowing 
alternative of the murder statute a cognizable offense under Utah law? 
Standard of Review, The interpretation of Utah's attempt statute is a matter of 
statutory interpretation, reviewed for correctness with no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1992). 
SECOND ISSUE ON APPEAL. Was defendant's conviction for his prior aggravated 
assault on the victim barred as a lesser included offense of his subsequent and separate act 
of attempted murder? 
Standard of Review. "Whether one crime is a lesser included offense of another is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness." State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 611,617-18 (Utah App. 
1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
The interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-
101(1999) is relevant to a determination of this case. Those sections provide in relevant part 
as follows: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402: 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal 
or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
* * * 
2 
u , .. ucicnuani r.iay be convicted of an of fense . >J^CJ ... u_ ottense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. /\n offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the 'facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise inc luded 
therein; 01 
^ j t j s specifically designated by a statute as a lessei inch ided 
offense. 
Utah Cede Ann ^ *<>-a -."'J-
i i: • -i purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
.nine it. acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial 
step toward commission of the offense. 
- (2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them 
to be. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
. Defendant was charged by information with atte-a • tedassav 1 
child abuse, R. 34-35, Defendant was also charged w ith e? i penalties on each count 
for use of a dangerous weapon in the commission of the crimes P ^ 4 ^ c \ f t e r h o l d i n g a 
p n i l i m i i i i i i \ IKMIII iiii'i! .in I I I I I |L ' I<I I | I I I I I M H I I I I I ill In mlLiiil HM H lllnii liiuill II"! ' Ml III!"' i n | n l l n v v i n g 
a two-day trial, a jury found defendant guilty on all thi'ee counts as charged, including the 
enhanced penalties. R , 67, 70' -71, 76-77,112-14,231-33. Trial counsel moved to withdraw 
after defendant expressed dissatisfaction with counsel's performance. R. 120-25. The court 
granted the motion and appointed new counsel. R. 126, 128-30, 136. Defendant was 
sentenced to consecutive prison terms of one-to-fifteen years for murder and zero-to-five 
years each for aggravated assault and child abuse. R. 189-90. The court also imposed a 
firearm enhancement penalty of one year on the murder conviction and zero-to-five years 
each on the aggravated assault and child abuse convictions. R. 191. 
Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that (1) the trial court improperly instructed 
the jury on the mens rea element of attempted murder, and (2) the aggravated assault charge 
was a lesser included offense of the murder charge. R. 142-44,168. After hearing argument, 
the trial court denied the motion. R. 192-96. Defendant timely appealed. R. 202. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On April 12,1999, defendant threatened to kill Tresa Franz as he pointed a loaded gun 
at her in a parked car; her four-year-old boy was sitting in the backseat. R.232:146-47,195, 
205. * The argument continued as defendant drove down a residential street. Again, 
defendant pointed the gun at Franz's head, this time pulling the trigger. R. 232:151,206-07; 
see also R. 233: 315-16, 322, 363. Fortunately, the gun did not fire. R. 232: 151,153; R. 
233:316. 
* * * 
!Only those facts that are relevant to the issues presented are included. The facts 
are otherwise recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Brown, 
948 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1997). 
4 
A Love Triangle 
Defendant and Franz had been seeing each other romantically on and off for several 
months and had lived together for some three months. R. 232: 139-40, 187-88. The 
relationship began about the same time defendant's relationship with Kammi Wilkerson, the 
mother of defendant's infant daughter, began to deteriorate. R. 233:462-64,473. Defendant 
renewed his relationship with Wilkerson a few months later, but continued to see Franz. R. 
233:462-63,473,484-85. Defendant and Franz broke up a day or two after Easter following 
an incident in which Franz's brother-in-law and another man jumped defendant and beat him 
up. R. 232: 139, 165; R. 233: 464-66. 
Towing the Truck 
Approximately one week later, defendant and his friend Terron Allred drove to 
Franz's home to tow a truck that had broken down. R. 232: 135,164,170, 238-39.2 After 
arriving at Franz's house, they each had a gin and Coke and defendant left for a short period 
to see Wilkerson. R. 232:137,164-65,174-75. After defendant returned, Allred, Franz, and 
her four-year-old son Quincy went with defendant to Magna to pick up the truck and tow it 
to another friend's house. R. 232: 136,170; R. 233: 309,489,497. By the time they left to 
tow the truck, defendant was very intoxicated. R. 232: 176; R. 233: 499. 
Rather than taking Franz and her four-year-old son home after towing the truck, 
defendant drove around instead. R. 232: 170; see also R. 233: 492-93, 501. They first 
2Defendant was driving the Geo Tracker which belonged to Latisha Bower, 
Allred's girlfriend. R. 232: 136; R. 233: 309. 
5 
stopped at a liquor store where defendant gave Franz five dollars to buy some rum. R. 232: 
137,139,175; R. 233: 498. After Franz bought a pint bottle ofrum, she and Allred each had 
a swig and defendant drank the bottle until a third was left. R.232: 137-38, 175-76; R. 233: 
310, 400-01. Affected by the alcohol he had consumed that day, defendant became vulgar 
and belligerent toward Franz. R.232: 138-41, 167, 176. When she asked him to take her 
home, he refused, laughing at her and threatening to kill her. R. 232: 140-41; R. 233: 492. 
Defendant then drove to Bruce Ribe's house and threatened to have some girls beat her up. 
R.232: 142, 170-71,240. 
After parking behind the house, defendant exited the car and spoke with Ribe's friend, 
Jerry Gonzalez, presumably about some cars. R. 232:143,170-71,242,260-61; R. 233:3 i i ~ 
12, 340, 467-68, 503. After speaking with Gonzalez for a few minutes, defendant started 
back to the car, but then walked over to speak with Bruce Ribe's niece, Tiffany, and her 
cousin Samantha, who sat on a couch on the back porch. R. 232:142-45,172,247-48,261-
63,285-86,468-69. As defendant spoke with the two girls, Franz and Allred remained in the 
car talking. R.232: 145. 
The Aggravated Assault 
After speaking with the two girls, defendant returned to the car and told Allred to get 
out. R. 232: 145,176,205,263,286; R. 233: 340,496; see also R. 233: 471. Allred exited 
the car and walked to the couch to speak with Tiffany. R.232:146,248,264,286-87. When 
defendant reached the car, he and Franz began a heated argument. R. 232: 248-49; R. 233: 
472, 503. Before stepping into the car, defendant reached behind the seat and pulled out a 
6 
loaded handgun from his camera bag, keeping it concealed from Franz's view. R. 232: 146, 
177, 194; R. 233: 364. When Franz asked if he was ready to go home, defendant declared, 
"F you, bitch. I'm going to take you home all right." R. 232: 146-47, 205. Defendant 
then took the gun and pointed it at Franz's neck. R. 232: 147, 195. Franz pleaded with 
defendant not to shoot her because her baby was in the car. R. 232: 147. Hearing the 
argument and witnessing defendant point the gun at Franz, Tiffany walked to the car, along 
with Allred, and told them they needed to leave. R.232:147,195,249-54,264,266-70,276, 
279-80,287. Allred got back in the car, and after defendant put the gun down and agreed to 
go, Tiffany returned to the house. R. 232: 149, 251, 254-55, 267, 271, 276. 
The Argument Resumes 
After Tiffany returned to the house, Franz fled the car into the house, but returned 
within two or three minutes after realizing that her son was still in the car. R. 232: 149,195, 
254-55, 271, 288; R. 233: 314-15, 345,474. When she returned, defendant told her to get 
back into the car. R.232:149-50,202-03,206; see also R. 233:346. She complied. R.232: 
149-50,202-03,206. After a brief pause in the argument, defendant again threatened Franz 
and rebuked her efforts to appease him. See R. 232: 150-51, 255. At that point, Tiffany's 
uncle emerged from the basement and told defendant to leave. See R. 232:200,255-56,274; 
R. 233: 347. Defendant apologized, backed out of the driveway, and drove down the street. 
R. 232: 206, 256,274, 289; R. 233: 347-48, 506. 
7 
The Attempted Murder 
Before reaching the end of the block, defendant again pointed the gun at Franz's face, 
but this time pulled the trigger. R.232: 151,206-07; see alsoR. 233: 315-16, 322,363. The 
gun misfired, failing to discharge. R. 232: 151, 153; R. 233: 316. Defendant then 
successfully fired the gun at Franz's feet, but the bullet missed Franz and lodged in the 
floorboard. R. 232: 153-54; R. 233: 323, 368, 402-03; see also R. 233: 511. Defendant 
pushed the barrel of the gun into Franz's head, but before he could pull the trigger, Franz 
pushed defendant's arm into the air and jumped out of the moving truck. R. 232: 154, 208-
10, 212; R. 233: 389, 479-80; see also R. 233: 324. As she jumped from the car, the gun 
discharged a second time. R. 232: 154; R. 233: 317. During the altercation, a total of three 
shots were successfully fired, one of which accidentally hit defendant's hand. R. 233: 323-
25,352,367,512. 
After the Shooting 
After Franz jumped from the moving car and began running down the street, 
defendant stopped while Allred put Franz's son out of the car. R. 232:154,210-11; R. 233: 
327,356, 513. After retrieving her son, Franz ran to a house and asked to use the telephone 
to report the incident to police. R. 232: 155-56; R. 233: 300-03. Although officers 
responded to the general location, Franz avoided contact with them, instead, hitching a ride 
home with one of Tiffany's friends. R. 232: 158,215,278; R. 233: 383-84. 
Meanwhile, defendant drove to Allred's apartment to pick up Kammi Wilkerson and 
the two babies she was tending. R. 233: 331-32, 358, 481. Defendant remained in the car 
8 
while Allred left to get Kammi. R. 233: 331-32. When Allred returned, the gun was no 
longer in the car. R. 233: 332. Defendant drove to West Valley Hospital to receive medical 
attention for his hand. R. 233: 334, 359, 483-84. When he was not attended to quickly 
enough, he drove to Jordan Valley Hospital. R. 233: 334, 359, 483-84. At Jordan Valley 
Hospital, defendant fabricated a story with Allred to give police. R. 233:334-35. Defendant 
then gave the fabricated story to police when they questioned him at the hospital. He told 
police that Franz had set him up by sending him to a house in Magna to pick up the truck, but 
when he had knocked on the door, someone shot him from inside. R. 233: 387, 515-17. 
The gun used by defendant was later found, together with four shell casings and one 
unspent round, in a hallway storage unit near Alfred's apartment. R. 233: 369-75,417,419. 
Testing at the Utah State Crime Lab revealed that the unspent round had misfired from the 
gun and that all four shell casings had been discharged from the gun. R. 233: 443-45. 
Later, while awaiting the preliminary hearing, defendant wrote Franz a letter asking 
her to help him "get out of this shit" and asking her not to come to court or otherwise make 
a statement about him. R. 233: 523-24. After the preliminary hearing was rescheduled 
because Franz failed to appear, defendant advised her to hide from police and gave her 
someone's name to assist her. R. 233: 525-28. 
Defendant's testimony at trial was equally damaging. Although he admitted pulling 
the gun from Franz's purse as they drove away, he denied having the gun at all while they 
were parked behind the house. R. 233: 475, 506-07. Yet, Tiffany, a disinterested witness, 
confirmed Franz's account that defendant pointed a gun at Franz then. R. 232:249-54,266-
9 
68, 279-82. And although Allred testified that Franz simply ran back out of Ribe's house 
after she fled from the car, R. 232: 345-46, defendant testified that he told Allred to go in 
after her and that he did so. R. 233: 505-06. However, neither Tiffany, nor her cousin, 
testified that Allred came after Franz. See R. 232: 254-55, 273-74, 288-90. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court recognized 
the crime of attempted murder for an intentional or knowing attempt to cause the death of 
another. Although the Supreme Court's decision in State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992), 
rejected one of the rationales posited in Maestas, it left undisturbed the central holding based 
on the second rationale cited in Maestas. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied 
defendant's motion for a new trial. 
Moreover, defendant was also properly convicted of both the aggravated assault and 
the attempted murder. While Utah law forbids punishing a defendant twice for a single act, 
a defendant may be convicted for offenses arising out of separate acts. Here, defendant was 
convicted of aggravated assault based on an act separate and apart from the act upon which 




DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTING TO 
INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSE THE DEATH OF TRESA 
FRANZ 
Defendant first argues that Utah law does not recognize a knowing attempt to cause 
the death of another and that the trial court therefore erred in charging defendant with 
intentionally or knowingly attempting to cause the death of Tresa Franz. Aplt. Brf. at 12-23. 
Defendant's claim fails. 
State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982), controls this case. Like defendant here, 
the defendant in Maestas argued that the crime of attempted murder requires a stronger 
showing of intent than the crime of an "intentional or knowing" murder. Maestas, 652 P.2d 
at 904. The Utah Supreme Court rejected that claim and held that Utah law recognizes the 
crime of attempted murder for "intentionally or knowingly" attempting to cause the death of 
another. Id. at 904-05 (emphasis added). 
The Maestas court based its holding on two rationales. First, the court observed that 
the defendant's theory rested on the "common law rule that intent is a necessary element of 
every 'attempt' crime even where the corresponding completed crime does not require intent 
as an element." Id. In rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court noted that common law 
crimes are no longer recognized in Utah; rather, crimes are now defined by statute. See id. 
The court then examined Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 which provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
11 
For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a 
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the 
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial 
step toward commission of the offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (1999). The court concluded that section 76-1-401 does not 
impose intent as an element of every attempt, but "requires only 'the kind of culpability 
otherwise required for the commission of the [completed] offense.'" Maestas, 652 P.2d at 
904 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1)) (brackets in original). 
As a second basis for its holding that Utah recognizes an intentional or knowing 
attempt to cause the death of another, the Maestas court observed: 
Th[e] rule [that intent is a necessary element of every attempt] differentiates 
between the intent requirements for an attempted and a completed crime only 
where the completed crime may be committed without the intent to commit that 
crime in particular, as in the case of felony murder. Where an intent to 
commit the particular crime is an element of the completed crime, the same 
intent requirement applies to the corresponding 'attempt' crime, even at 
common law. Thus, Utah's first degree murder statute, which does contain 
such an intent requirement, would not fall within the rule cited by defendant 
even under common law principles. 
Maestas, 652 P.2d at 905 (emphasis added). This rationale is consistent with logic and 
common sense. To "attempt" means "[t]o try to do, make, or achieve," Webster's II New 
Riverside University Dictionary 136 (1988), or "to endeavour," Oxford English Dictionary 
(2d ed. 1989). A person can knowingly attempt, try, or endeavor to cause the death of 
another. On the other hand, a person does not attempt, try, or endeavor to act negligently, 
recklessly, or with depraved indifference to cause the death of another. 
12 
As the Supreme Court observed in State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1984) 
(per curiam), section 76-4-101 "adopts the definition of an 'attempt' employed in the Model 
Penal Code, §§ 5.01, purposed on drawing the line further away from the final act and 
enlarging the common law concept." The commentaries to the Model Penal Code provide 
that the "attempt provision requires either intentional conduct or the belief that the actor's 
conduct will result in the proscribed act" State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah 1992) 
{citing 1 Amer.L.Inst., Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 5.01,303 (1985)) (emphasis 
added). Therefore, the recognition of the crime of attempted murder for an intentional or 
knowing attempt to cause the death of another is consistent with the Model Penal Code after 
which section 76-4-101 was fashioned.3 In holding that attempted murder "can be knowingly 
committed," the Arizona Court of Appeals observed that while "the drafters of the Model 
Penal Code agreed that there should be no attempt crime for negligent or reckless homicide[,] 
[t]he Code goes on to state: 
"When, on the other hand, a person actually believes that his behavior will 
produce the proscribed result, it is appropriate to treat him as attempting to 
cause the result, whether or not that is his purpose. 
Subsection (l)(b) provides that when causing a particular result is an element 
of the crime, as in homicide offenses or criminally obtaining property, an actor 
commits an attempt when he does or omits to do anything with the purpose of 
causing 'or with the belief that it will cause' such result without further 
3But see Vigil, 842 P.2d at 846-47 (citing Loren Martin, Utah Criminal Code 
Outline 169 (1973), which notes that the Utah attempt statute was modeled after the 1971 
Proposed Federal Criminal Code, and citing 1 National Commission on Reform of 
Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of 
Federal Criminal Laws 354 & n.6, which states that the attempt provision requires 
intentional conduct). 
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conduct on his part. Thus, a belief that death will ensue from the actor's 
conduct, or that property will be obtained, will suffice, as well as would a 
purpose to bring about those results. If, for example, the actor's purpose were 
to demolish a building and, knowing that persons were in the building and that 
they would be killed by the explosion, he nevertheless detonated a bomb that 
turned out to be defective, he could be prosecuted for attempted murder even 
though it was no part of his purpose that the inhabitants of the building would 
be killed. 
State v. Nunez, 769 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Ari. App. 1989) {citing Model Penal Code §§ 
5.01.2, at 301 (1985)). 
In Vigil, ten years after Maestas, the Supreme Court revisited the issue in the context 
of depraved indifference murder. In concluding that Utah law does not recognize depraved 
indifference homicide, the court re-examined Utah's attempt statute, and in particular, the 
effect of the second paragraph, which reads: 
For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101. Contrary to Maestas, the court in Vigil determined that the 
"culpability" referred to in the first paragraph refers not to the actor's mental state, but "to 
the attendant circumstances, if any, of the underlying offense." Vigil, 842 P.2d at 845-46. 
On the other hand, the court concluded, the second paragraph "limit[s] the attempt statute to 
offenses with a mental state of 'intent.'" Id. at 846. In other words, the court re-interpreted 
the statute in a manner consistent with the common law crime of attempt. The Vigil court 
observed that the "culpability" rationale relied on in Maestas conflicted with its decisions 
refusing to recognize attempted reckless manslaughter and attempted murder under the 
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felony murder alternative. Id. at 847-48 & n.5.4 Thus, the court in Vigil expressly rejected 
the "culpability" rationale adopted in Maestas, holding that it was "incorrect" and 
"inconsistent" with its decisions in Vigil and other cases. Id. at 848 n.5. 
However, the Vigil court left undisturbed the central holding of Maestas, concluding 
that the second rationale was "still good law." Id. at 848 n.5. While rejecting Maestas 's 
culpability rationale, the Vigil court expressly "note[d] that Maestas is still good law insofar 
as it authorizes prosecution for attempted aggravated murder under the intentional or 
knowing formulation of section 76-5-202(1) or attempted murder under the intentional or 
knowing formulation of section 76-5-203(1 )(a)." Vigil, 842 P.2d at 848 n.5 (emphasis 
added). Therefore, contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, Vigil does not support the 
proposition that one cannot be convicted of attempted murder for intentionally or knowingly 
attempting to cause the death of another. Indeed, Vigil left undisturbed its holding in 
Maestas. 
Nor does the Court's decision in State v. Hasten, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993), compel 
a different conclusion as defendant contends. Aplt. Brf. at 16. In Hasten, the jury was 
allowed to consider three alternative theories of attempted murder, including the knowing 
"See State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 393 (Utah 1989) (holding that "[t]he crime of 
attempted murder does not fit within the felony-murder doctrine because an attempt to 
commit a crime requires proof of an intent to consummate the crime"); State v. Norman, 
580 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah 1978) (holding that an attempt under reckless manslaughter is 
not cognizable because that alternative simply requires the mental state of recklessness, 
whereas "[a]n attempt to commit a crime is an act done with the intent to commit that 
crime"); see also State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 94 (Utah 1982) (recognizing the crime of 
attempted manslaughter under the imperfect legal justification alternative because the 
killing must be intentional). 
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or intentional alternative and the depraved indifference alternative. Haston, 846 P.2d at 
1277. The court reversed only because defendant could have been convicted under the 
depraved indifference alternative. Id. The court expressed no concern whatsoever that the 
defendant could have been convicted under the intentional or knowing alternative. See id.5 
The Supreme Court's recognition in Maestas and Vigil of the crime of attempted 
murder under the intentional or knowing formulation is consistent with pronouncements of 
both this Court and the Supreme Court, before and after Vigil. See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 
947 P.2d 630, 642 (Utah 1997) (comparing the penalty for aggravated assault by a prisoner 
with that for "attempted murder, which also requires an intent to kill or a knowledge that 
one's acts would result in death if carried out"); State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 
1986) (holding that in order to convict defendant, "the State must have adduced evidence that 
would have allowed the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally 
Moreover, contrary to defendant's suggestion on appeal, a murder under the 
depraved indifference alternative is not equivalent to knowingly causing the death of 
another. In this regard, Justice Maughan observed that "it was the intention of the 
drafters of the Model Penal Code (and hence our Legislature which substantially adopted 
it) to leave to the finder of fact the determination of whether a defendant's reckless 
conduct is so extreme as to be equivalent to purpose or knowledge (i. e., intent) from the 
circumstances surrounding the creation of the risk of death. Since an intentional or 
knowing homicide is second degree murder under subsection (a) of the statute, I do not 
believe that the Legislature intended that 'depraved indifference to human life' under 
subsection (c) should be measured by the same 'awareness' of the certainty that the risk 
would result in death as the word 'knowing' would entail. Instead, the greatness of the 
risk, and the lack of justification for the creation of that risk are the tests." State v. 
Nicholson, 585 P.2d 60, (Utah 1978) (Maughan, J., concurring); see also State v. 
Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 373-74 (Utah 1996). 
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or knowingly attempted to cause [the victim's] death"); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 
1157 (Utah 1991) (upholding attempted murder conviction because "[t]he jury could 
certainly [have] infer[red] from [defendant's] statements . . . that [defendant] administered 
the [poison] with the necessary intent or knowledge"); State v. White, 880 P.2d 18,23 (Utah 
App. 1994) (observing that where defense counsel conceded that defendant stabbed the 
victim and the victim was seriously injured, "the only remaining question for the jury to 
determine was whether [defendant] had the intentional or knowing state of mind required for 
conviction of attempted murder"). It is also consistent with decisions in other states. See, 
e.g., Bartlett v. State, 711 N.E.2d 497, 499 (Ind. 1999) (observing that "[t]o sustain an 
attempted murder conviction, the State must prove that the defendant took a substantial step 
towards the intentional or knowing killing of another); People v. Gonzalez, 926 P.2d 153, 
155 (Colo. App. 1996) (holding that "attempted second degree murder requires an awareness 
that death is practically certain to result"); Gentry v. State, 881 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. App. 
1994) (holding that "[t]o convict appellant of attempted murder, the State had to prove that 
appellant intentionally or knowingly intended to cause the death of the complainant"); Nunez, 
769 P.2d at 1042-43 ("concluding] that attempted first degree murder can be knowingly 
committed"); Free v. State, 455 So.2d 137, 147 (Ala. App. 1984) (observing that 
"[a]ttempted murder is a specific intent crime" and therefore "[o]ne must intentionally or 
knowingly attempt to commit murder"); State v. Feliciano, 618 P.2d 306,308 (Haw. 1980) 
(holding that "[a]ttempted murder is established when a defendant intentionally or knowingly 
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attempted to cause the death of another through an act which is a substantial step in the 
course of conduct intended to culminate in the crime of murder").6 
Defendant also contends that the evidence supported knowing conduct rather than 
intentional conduct. Aplt. Brf. at 21-22. As discussed above, the distinction is irrelevant 
where Utah recognizes attempted murder for the intentional or knowing attempt to cause the 
death of another. Moreover, contrary to defendant's claim, the evidence is much more 
corroborative of a specific intent to kill notwithstanding defendant's inebriation. See R. 232: 
141 (defendant declaring, "F you, bitch. I'll f ing kill you"), 151 (victim testifying 
that defendant put gun to her face and pulled the trigger), 197-99 (Tiffany Ribe telling victim 
that defendant was going to kill her); R. 233: 303 (neighbor testifying that victim's son told 
him defendant was going to kill his mother); see also Dumas, 721 P.2d at 504-05 (evidence 
showed intent to kill where defendant threatened to kill the victim and took steps to 
accomplish that purpose).7 
In summary, Maestas conclusively recognizes the crime of attempted murder for an 
intentional or knowing attempt to cause the death of another. Vigil did not upset that holding. 
Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a new trial. 
6For jurisdictions which have not recognized a knowing attempt, see Aplt. Brf. at 
20-21; see also Huitt v. State, 678 P.2d 415,420 (Alaska App. 1984) (holding that the 
mental state of "knowingly" is insufficient to establish attempted murder). 
7Defendant has not argued that he did not take a substantial step toward the 
commission of the attempted murder. Indeed, the act of pointing the gun at the victim 
and pulling the trigger, though a misfire, constitutes a substantial step. See People v. 
Files, 632 N.E.2d 1087, 1096 (111. App. 1994); State v. Turner, 587 A.2d 1050, 1053 
(Conn. App.), cert denied, 591 A.2d 812 (Conn. 1991). 
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II. 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT AND ATTEMPTED MURDER. 
Distilled to its essence, defendant's second claim on appeal is that the attempted 
murder of Tresa Franz was simply the culmination of a single act by defendant to assault her 
with a firearm. See Aplt. Brf. at 23-36. He thus argues that his aggravated assault conviction 
is a lesser-included offense of his attempted murder conviction and that the two merge. Aplt. 
Brf. at 27-30. This claim lacks merit because defendant's aggravated assault conviction was 
based on an act entirely different than and separate from the act upon which his attempted 
murder conviction was based. 
The first paragraph of section 76-1-402 provides: 
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act 
of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which 
may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the 
act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any 
other such provision. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1999). The third paragraph of section 76-1-402 states that 
"[a] defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not 
be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1 -
402(3). The intent of these provisions is clear. A defendant may be prosecuted and punished 
for all crimes committed within a single criminal episode so long as they each arise from a 
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separate act. On the other hand, "[a] defendant may not be punished twice for a single act." 
State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1986) (referring to the first paragraph). 
Defendant argues that because the two acts were part of the same criminal episode, 
consisting of the same criminal objective, he cannot be convicted of both offenses. Aplt. Brf. 
at 30-33. However, section 76-1-402 and the merger doctrine only forbid punishing a 
defendant twice for the same act. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. They do not forbid 
punishing a defendant for multiple acts committed in a single criminal episode. Id. 
Because defendant was convicted of two different offenses for two distinct and 
separate acts, the merger doctrine for greater and lesser included offenses does not apply. 
The first assault occurred behind Tiffany Ribe's house when defendant threatened Franz and 
pointed a gun at her. The second assault, which amounted to attempted murder, occurred 
nearly a block away five to ten minutes later when defendant pointed the gun at Franz and 
fired at her at least twice, though one was a misfire. Each assault was a separate and distinct 
"voluntary bodily movement" or act. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(1) (1999); accord 
State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61,63 (Utah App. 1989). "As a result, section 76-1-402(1) permits 
separate charging and convictions for each of these separate acts, although they were 
committed within the same criminal episode." Mane, 783 P.2d at 63. 
Defendant asserts that "[according to the prosecutor, the only fact that distinguished 
the charges was the fact that Casey allegedly pulled the trigger, thereby transforming the 
single act of pointing the gun at Tresa into two separate crimes of aggravated assault and 
attempted murder." Aplt. Brf. at 30. That characterization of the State's argument at trial 
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mischaracterizes the State's theory and the evidence it presented to prove the two crimes. 
The State did not allege that defendant committed aggravated assault when he pointed the 
gun at Franz in the instant before he fired the gun at her as they drove down the road. Rather, 
the State consistently alleged, and proved at trial, that defendant committed the first 
aggravated assault when he pointed the gun at Franz earlier when they were parked in the 
driveway behind the house. R. 232: 119 (opening statement of prosecutor); R. 233: 536 
(prosecutor's closing argument). As stated, the aggravated assault and the much later 
attempted homicide were separate acts. 
Moreover, the acts charged and proved were separated by time, place, and intervening 
circumstances. As defendant concedes, the two acts occurred five to ten minutes apart. Aplt. 
Brf. at 26. The threat occurred in the driveway behind the house, while the attempt to shoot 
Franz occurred about four houses away as defendant drove down the road. A number of 
intervening circumstances also separated the two acts. After Franz pleaded with defendant 
not to shoot her in the presence of her son and after Tiffany intervened, defendant put the gun 
down. R.232:147-49,195,249-55,264-71,276,279-80,287. Franz then ran into the house 
where she apparently remained for several minutes. R. 232: 149,195,254-55,271,288; R. 
233: 314-15, 345,474. There was an apparent pause in the argument once she returned to 
the car. R.232:150-51,255. When the argument again ensued and Tiffany's uncle emerged 
from the basement to ask them to leave, defendant apologized and left. See R. 232:200,206, 
255-56, 274, 289; R. 233: 347-48, 506. In other words, defendant's threat to Franz was 
completed in the driveway and constituted a separate act. 
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Defendant's argument might have had merit if the act while driving the car, i.e., 
pulling the trigger and firing the gun, could not have been committed "without also 
necessarily committing the other" act, i.e., threatening Franz in the driveway. See State v. 
Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 1239 (Utah 1989). Such would be the case had the State charged 
defendant with an aggravated assault for his actions while driving the car down the road. 
That, however, was not the case. Clearly, defendant cannot be convicted for the second 
assault which occurred down the road in the instant before he pulled the trigger.8 That 
assault would clearly merge with the attempted murder conviction. 
On the other hand, the assault that took place five to ten minutes earlier in the 
driveway was not incidental to the attempted murder, but was "separate and independent 
therefrom." State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, at f 19,994 P.2d 1243. As discussed above, it 
was separated by time, place, and intervening circumstances. Indeed, as stated, the 
aggravated assault behind Tiffany's house was fully completed before Franz ever returned 
to the car. In short, defendant still could have attempted the murder without having 
committed the aggravated assault in the driveway. See Young, 780 P.2d at 1239; cf. State v. 
Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843,844 (Utah 1986) (upholding conviction and sentencing for aggravated 
kidnapping and sexual assault because they were separate acts). 
8At trial, the prosecutor never argued that this conduct constituted the aggravated 
assault and the jury could not have been confused on that issue. The prosecutor clearly 
stated that defendant was being charged with aggravated assault "for pointing a gun at 
Tresa [Franz's] head while they were parked behind Tiffany Ribe's house." R. 232: 119. 
He reiterated that fact in closing. R. 233: 536. Significantly, defendant did not object to 
the instructions as given. See R. 233: 449-52, 529-32. 
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Defendant cites to State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980), and State v. Crosby, 
927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996), in support of his claim that the two separate assaults were one. 
Those cases, however, involved thefts committed under a continuing scheme. The Kimbel 
test has not been extended beyond theft or embezzlement cases. See State v. Patience, 944 
P.2d 381, 390 (Utah App. 1997). In Patience, this Court refused to apply the Kimbel test to 
forgery cases even if the forgeries were committed in the course of a continuous transaction, 
holding instead that a defendant could be convicted for each document forged. Id. Indeed, 
while the Supreme Court in Crosby required the theft charges to be consolidated, it did not 
preclude the separate conviction of the lone forgery charge, even though it appears the 
objective was the same, i.e., to misappropriate company funds. See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 645-
46. In short, the Kimbel test is in effect a narrow exception to section 76-1 -402 which allows 
the prosecution of "all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-402(1). Defendant has not demonstrated that that test applies here. 
In summary, defendant's convictions for aggravated assault and attempted murder 
were not based on a single act, but on two separate acts. Accordingly, defendant was 
appropriately convicted of both offenses under section 76-1-402.9 
9Even if the two convictions did merge, the appropriate remedy would not be to 
vacate the attempted murder conviction as suggested by defendant. Aplt. Brf. at 33. The 
law is well-established that where, as here, "the greater crime is proven, then the lesser 
crime merges into it." State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1313 (Utah 1986) {citing Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3)). Moreover, because defendant requested that the aggravated 
assault conviction be set aside in his motion to vacate, he waived any claim on appeal that 
the attempted murder conviction should instead be vacated. R. 143 A. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted this I day of March, 2001. 
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